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INTRODUCTION
The dire pronouncements in plaintiffs’ opposition—that the ACA, for example,
“threatens the foundational principles of the Constitution” and grants the federal government
“absolute sovereignty” and a “censorial power over the people,” Opp’n 34, 35—signal the
political rather than legal nature of plaintiffs’ many claims. Beneath the rhetoric, what plaintiffs
ask this Court to do is disregard the jurisdictional limits of Article III and the Anti-Injunction
Act, abandon the deference courts pay to duly enacted legislation, and depart from settled law.
Contrary to plaintiffs’ accusations, upholding the minimum coverage provision and the employer
responsibility provision requires no “unparalleled expansion of the Commerce Clause.” Id. at 1.
These provisions are important, but incremental, extensions of decades of federal regulation of
the health care market—extensions that are by no means revolutionary. They are necessary and
proper to ensure the success of the ACA’s broader insurance reforms. And apart from ensuring
the viability of the ACA’s regulations of the insurance industry, these provisions by themselves
regulate economic decisions about how to finance health care services that impose tens of
billions of dollars annually in costs on interstate commerce.
Plaintiffs’ trail of Article IV, First Amendment, Fifth Amendment, Tenth Amendment,
and statutory claims also leads nowhere. Contrary to plaintiffs’ doomsday predictions, the ACA
does not spell the end of a republican form of government in the United States. Nor does it
prevent plaintiffs from “making healthy lifestyle choices” (id. at 36), require them to pay for
unnecessary medical procedures, or require them to obtain health care services that conflict with
their religious beliefs; there is therefore no violation of the Free Exercise Clause or the Religious
Freedom Restoration Act. Plaintiffs cannot salvage their free speech and free association claims

1
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by asserting that Congress has never before mandated that “individuals and employers
involuntarily participate in economic activity,” id. at 39, as this consideration—even if it were
true—is irrelevant to whether the coverage provisions affect plaintiffs’ ability to express a
message. Nor do the ACA’s two religious exemptions raise an Establishment Clause question;
these exemptions do not require any more “intrusive monitoring of religious belief” than the
“monitoring” that already occurs under a nearly identical exemption in the Internal Revenue
Code—an exemption courts have repeatedly upheld. Plaintiffs’ equal protection challenge is
equally baseless; they deem the ACA’s existing exemptions irrational for not accommodating
more conscientious objectors, but it is well settled that under-inclusiveness alone does not render
a law irrational.

Finally, plaintiffs’ belated attempt to raise a Tenth Amendment anti-

commandeering challenge must fail, as only a state has standing to bring such a suit.
Clearly, plaintiffs disagree with the policy judgments embodied in the statute, as they are
entitled to do. But this Court is not the proper place to resolve that disagreement.
ARGUMENT
I.

THIS COURT LACKS SUBJECT MATTER JURISDICTION
A.

No plaintiff has suffered an injury-in-fact

Plaintiffs do not dispute that the two legislator plaintiffs—Delegate Kathy Byron and
Council Member Jeff Helgeson—cannot base standing on injuries that are institutional and
ideological. See Opening Br. 17-18; Raines v. Byrd, 521 U.S. 811, 816 (1997). Further, they
neither explain how the ACA’s so-called “layers of bureaucratic regulation” will affect Dr.
David Stein’s practice nor cite any provision of the ACA that will “interfere with Dr. Stein’s
liberty interest in practicing his profession,” Second Am. Compl. ¶ 35. These claims of injury
2
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reduce to mere ideological umbrage at the statute Congress has enacted. As for the claims of
plaintiffs Liberty, Waddell, and Merrill—it is fatal, without more, that they seek to enjoin
statutory provisions that will not take effect until 2014. Any alleged injury from a provision not
scheduled to take effect for years is “too remote temporally” to support standing. McConnell v.
FEC, 540 U.S. 93, 226 (2003), overruled in part on other grounds by Citizens United v. FEC,
130 S. Ct. 876 (2010). 1
Indeed, the remoteness of any alleged injury renders plaintiffs’ claims entirely
speculative. Liberty asserts that it “assuredly faces significant penalties” in 2015 because “the
University’s coverage will almost certainly be determined insufficient” in 2014, Opp’n 3, but the
basis for Liberty’s assurance on this point is unclear. As explained previously, Opening Br. 1415, Liberty’s current coverage may satisfy the employer responsibility provision, and even if it
does not, it is also quite possible that no full-time employee will receive a premium tax credit in
a health insurance Exchange, in which case Liberty would not be liable for any penalty. As for
the individual plaintiffs, by 2014, any number of changes in their personal or financial situation
may lead them to satisfy the minimum coverage provision. As the first and only court to address
this standing issue reasoned, “even if [the plaintiff] does not have insurance at this time, he may
well satisfy the minimum coverage provision of the Act by 2014: he may take a job that offers
health insurance, or qualify for Medicaid or Medicare, or he may choose to purchase health

1

According to plaintiffs, the conclusion in McConnell rested on “[t]he contingent nature of a
claim that a regulation might affect future decisions that might be made if other decisions are
made.” Opp’n 13. Plaintiffs misread McConnell. The Court did not base its conclusion on the
likelihood that Senator McConnell would run for reelection or on the probability that the alleged
injury would occur. The Court reasoned instead that an injury five years in the future is simply
“too remote temporally” to support standing. McConnell, 540 U.S. at 226. So too here.
3
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insurance before the effective date of the Act.” Baldwin v. Sebelius, No. 10-1033, 2010 WL
3418436, at *3 (S.D. Cal. Aug. 27, 2010).
B.

Plaintiffs’ claims are unripe

For the same reasons, plaintiffs’ claims are not ripe for review.

Plaintiffs cannot

transform the speculative possibility of future injury into current concrete harm by asserting that
the coverage provisions require them “either [to] begin extensive reorganization of their personal
and financial affairs or risk being liable for thousands of dollars in penalties beginning in 2014.”
Opp’n 9. Such reasoning would render the standing requirement meaningless. A plaintiff could
always assert a current need to prepare for the most remote and ill-defined harms. Indeed, if
plaintiffs’ theory were correct, in McConnell, Senator McConnell could easily have
circumvented his lack of standing merely by alleging that he was preparing now for the
possibility that he might run for reelection five years in the future. In any event, plaintiffs do not
explain how the minimum coverage provision or the employer responsibility provision is forcing
them now, years before these provisions will take effect, to undergo “significant lifestyle and
occupational changes.” Id. Their “naked assertion[s] devoid of ‘further factual enhancement’”
do not suffice to show an actual, imminent injury. Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. 1937, 1949
(2009) (quoting Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 557 (2007)) (alteration in original).
Finally, even if plaintiffs were currently taking some action in anticipation of the
minimum coverage and employer responsibility provisions, this action is not fairly traceable to
the ACA. Any decision that plaintiffs make now to “extensive[ly] reorganiz[e] . . . their personal
and financial affairs” (Opp’n 9) “stems not from the operation of [the challenged statute] but
from [plaintiffs’] own . . . personal choice.” McConnell, 540 U.S. at 228. Indeed, this Court
4
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would “simply will not be able to determine whether” the ACA caused plaintiffs’ alleged
injuries. Sanner v. Bd. of Trade of City of Chi., 62 F.3d 918, 924 (7th Cir. 1995). As in Sanner,
“a host of articulable and inarticulable reasons” may lead plaintiffs to decide “not to purchase”;
plaintiffs’ assertions that the ACA is the sole culprit are thus insufficient as a matter of law. Id.
at 923-24 (internal citations and quotation marks omitted).
Plaintiffs also say that the issues here are fit for judicial decision because they are purely
legal. Opp’n 8. Ripeness, however, turns not merely on the nature of the claim, but on whether
and when it will arise. Or, as the Supreme Court framed the inquiry in Toilet Goods Ass’n v.
Gardner, the issue is not only “how adequately a court can deal with the legal issue presented,
but also . . . the degree and nature of the regulation’s present effect on those seeking relief.” 387
U.S. 158, 164 (1967) (emphasis added). Even where the issue presented is “a purely legal
question,” id. at 163, uncertainty whether a statutory provision will harm the plaintiffs renders
the controversy not ripe for review, id. at 163-64. The cases plaintiffs cite do not hold otherwise;
rather, they confirm that an actual or imminent injury, or a credible threat of an immediate
criminal penalty if the plaintiff violates the law, is a prerequisite for a ripe claim. 2

2

See Pac. Gas & Elec. Co. v. State Energy Res. Conservation & Dev. Comm’n, 461 U.S. 190,
201 (1983) (plaintiffs had to spend millions to build nuclear facilities before resolution of the
legal issue); Virginia v. Am. Booksellers Ass’n, 484 U.S. 383, 392-93 (1988) (“[T]he law is
aimed directly at plaintiffs, who, if their interpretation of the statute is correct, will have to take
significant and costly compliance measures or risk criminal prosecution.”); Pierce v. Soc’y of
Sisters, 268 U.S. 510, 532 (1925) (“The Compulsory Education Act of 1922 has already caused
the withdrawal from its schools of children who would otherwise continue, and their income has
steadily declined.” (emphasis added)); Reg’l Rail Reorganization Act Cases, 419 U.S. 102, 144
(1974) (The Act “necessitates the present denial to the railroads in reorganization of options
otherwise available.” (emphasis added)); Lake Carriers’ Ass’n v. Macmullan, 406 U.S. 498, 50607 (1972) (plaintiffs were “required under Michigan law to install sewage storage devices [and
are] now under such an obligation.” (emphasis added)).
5
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The Anti-Injunction Act bars plaintiffs’ claims

The Anti-Injunction Act (“AIA”) likewise bars jurisdiction here. Plaintiffs raise three
failing arguments to the contrary. First, plaintiffs try to evade the AIA by arguing that the
provision imposes a penalty rather than a tax. Opp’n 14. This characterization is irrelevant. As
with many provisions of the Internal Revenue Code, interpretation requires several steps, but
each is crystal clear. The AIA itself applies to “any tax,” 26 U.S.C. § 7421(a), and 26 U.S.C. §
6671(a) directs that “any reference in this title to ‘tax’ imposed by this title shall be deemed also
to refer to the penalties and liabilities provided by this subchapter,” i.e., subchapter B of chapter
68 (emphasis added). The minimum coverage provision, 26 U.S.C. § 5000A(g)(1), in turn
directs that “[t]he penalty provided by this section shall . . . be assessed and collected in the same
manner as an assessable penalty under subchapter B of chapter 68” (emphasis added). Thus,
like the other penalties in subchapter B of chapter 68, the minimum coverage provision is subject
to the AIA. See Barr v. United States, 736 F.2d 1134, 1135 (7th Cir. 1984).
Second, plaintiffs argue that they “are challenging the constitutionality of a
comprehensive healthcare reform law, not attempting to halt the Internal Revenue Service’s
collection of taxes.” Opp’n 15. For AIA purposes, this is immaterial. Rejecting a similar
argument in Bob Jones University v. Simon, the Supreme Court reasoned that “[b]ecause an
injunction preventing the Service from withdrawing a § 501(c)(3) ruling letter would necessarily
preclude the collection of FICA, FUTA, and possibly income taxes from the affected
organization . . . a suit seeking such relief falls squarely within the literal scope of the Act.” 416
U.S. 731-32 (1974). Plaintiffs’ suit, if successful, “would necessarily preclude” the assessment
or collection of the penalty described by § 5000A, and is accordingly barred. Id.; see also

6
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Dickens v. United States, 671 F.2d 969, 971 (6th Cir. 1982) (AIA is “not limited to suits aimed at
the specific act of assessment or collection”).
Third, plaintiffs insist that the AIA is inapplicable because they are “seeking redress for
violations of fundamental constitutional rights” which “cannot be regained by receipt of a refund
check.” Opp’n 15. But the AIA’s jurisdictional limitations apply even where a plaintiff raises a
constitutional challenge: “The ‘decisions of this Court make it unmistakably clear that the
constitutional nature of a taxpayer’s claim . . . is of no consequence’ to whether the prohibition
against tax injunctions applies.” United States v. Clintwood Elkhorn Mining Co., 553 U.S. 1, 10
(2008) (quoting Alexander v. “Americans United” Inc., 416 U.S. 752, 759 (1974)). And “[a]
taxpayer cannot render an available review procedure an inadequate remedy at law by
voluntarily forgoing it.” Americans United, Inc., 416 U.S. at 762 n.13. 3
II.

THE COMPREHENSIVE REGULATORY MEASURES OF THE ACA,
INCLUDING THE MINIMUM COVERAGE PROVISION, ARE A PROPER
EXERCISE OF CONGRESS’S POWERS UNDER THE COMMERCE AND
NECESSARY AND PROPER CLAUSES
A.

The minimum coverage provision, which regulates the financing of health
care services, is integral to the larger regulatory scheme and is necessary and
proper to the regulation of interstate commerce

Congress may regulate even wholly intrastate, wholly non-economic matters that form
“‘an essential part of a larger regulation of economic activity, in which the regulatory scheme
could be undercut unless the intrastate activity were regulated.’” Gonzales v. Raich, 545 U.S. 1,
24-25 (2005) (quoting United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 561 (1995)).
3

As explained

Nor do plaintiffs fall within the exception to the Anti-Injunction Act created by Enochs v.
Williams Packing & Navigation Co., 370 U.S. 1 (1962). The Williams Packing exception
permits suits only to remedy exceptionally clear and irreparable infringements. Congress acted
well within its Article I powers by enacting the ACA. To say the least, the merits of plaintiffs’
contrary claim are not “so obvious that the Government [has] no chance of prevailing.”
Clintwood Elkhorn Mining Co., 553 U.S. at 14.
7
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previously, Congress rationally determined that it was necessary to regulate the means in which
health care services are financed so that health insurance would become more available and
affordable.
Plaintiffs concede that Congress has authority to require the ACA’s insurance reforms.
Opp’n 25. And they do not dispute that, if there were no minimum coverage requirement, the
Act’s insurance reforms would lead some individuals to “wait to purchase health insurance until
they needed care.” Pub. L. No. 111-148, §§ 1501(a)(2)(I), 10106(a). These concessions resolve
the matter because, without the minimum coverage provision, the incentive to delay obtaining
coverage would lead to higher premiums and less affordable coverage, ultimately driving the
insurance market “into extinction.” Health Reform in the 21st Century: Insurance Market
Reforms: Hearing Before the H. Comm. on Ways and Means, 111th Cong. 13 (2009) (Uwe
Reinhardt, Ph.D.). 4 Research on the experience of states that have attempted “guaranteed issue”
and “community rating” reforms without an accompanying minimum coverage provision
confirms that this danger may not be merely theoretical. 5 The minimum coverage provision is
thus essential to the larger regulatory scheme of the ACA, which is designed to make health
insurance more available and affordable. Pub. L. No. 111-148, §§ 1501(a)(2)(I), 10106(a);
Raich, 545 U.S. at 24-25.
4

Plaintiffs object to consideration of Congressional Budget Office studies, committee hearings,
and letters to members of Congress on this motion to dismiss. Opp’n 20-21. But plaintiffs’
objection has been squarely rejected by the Fourth Circuit. See Anheuser-Busch, Inc. v.
Schmoke, 63 F.3d 1305, 1312 (1995) (“For purposes of Rule 12(b)(6), the legislative history of
an ordinance is not a matter beyond the pleadings but is an adjunct to the ordinance which may
be considered by the court as a matter of law.”), vacated and remanded on other grounds, 517
U.S. 1206 (1996) (mem.).
5
See Alan C. Monheit et al., Community Rating & Sustainable Individual Health Insurance
Markets in New Jersey, 23 Health Affairs 167, 168 (2004); Stephen T. Parente & Tarren
Bragdon, Healthier Choice: An Examination of Market Based Reforms for New York’s
Uninsured, Medical Progress Report No. 10, at i (Manhattan Inst., Sept. 2009).
8
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For similar reasons, the minimum coverage provision is a valid exercise of Congress’s
authority under the Necessary and Proper Clause. In response, plaintiffs do not deny that the
minimum coverage provision satisfies the rational basis standard applied under the Necessary
and Proper Clause since M’Culloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316 (1819). They instead
suggest that United States v. Comstock, 130 S. Ct. 1949 (2010), (without saying so) overthrew
centuries of precedent and demanded a heightened standard of review for exercises of power
under the Necessary and Proper Clause. Opp’n 26-28. But Comstock did no such thing. It did
not create a new five-part test under the Necessary and Proper Clause; it instead reiterated
M’Culloch and its progeny, which recognize that the Clause “‘leaves to Congress a large
discretion as to the means that may be employed in executing a given power,’” Comstock, 130 S.
Ct. at 1957 (quoting Lottery Case, 188 U.S. 321, 355 (1903)), and identified five considerations,
specific to that case, that supported the Court’s judgment.
B.

The minimum coverage provision regulates conduct that substantially affects
interstate commerce

Even if Congress had enacted the minimum coverage provision by itself, it would still
fall within the commerce power, as the provision regulates conduct that substantially affects
interstate commerce. Plaintiffs nowhere dispute that uninsured individuals consume billions of
dollars in uncompensated care each year—$43 billion in 2008 alone—shifting their costs to
health care providers, to the insured population in the form of higher premiums, to governments,
and to taxpayers. Pub. L. No. 111-148, §§ 1501(a)(2)(F), 10106(a). This point is decisive,
because Congress may regulate activity that, in the aggregate, imposes substantial and direct
burdens on an interstate market.

9
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Plaintiffs nonetheless liken this case to United States v. Morrison and United States v.
Lopez, where the Supreme Court struck down statutes as exceeding Congress’s Commerce
Clause authority. But in each case, as explained previously, the statute had at best a highly
attenuated connection to any economic activity, and did not form a part of a broader scheme of
economic regulation. In Morrison, the Court invalidated the cause of action created in VAWA,
finding that any link between gender-motivated violence and economic activity could be
established only through a chain of speculative assumptions. Similarly, in Lopez, the Court
struck down a ban on possession of a handgun in a school zone because the ban was not part of
an overall scheme of firearms regulation, and it related to economic activity only insofar as the
presence of guns near schools might impair learning, which in turn might undermine economic
productivity. The Court reasoned that Congress may not “pile inference upon inference” to find
a link between the regulated activity and interstate commerce. Lopez, 514 U.S. at 567. 6
In this case, the direct connection with interstate commerce is nothing like the chains of
inferences found insufficient in Morrison and Lopez. “No piling is needed here to show that
Congress was within its prerogative” to regulate interstate commerce. Sabri v. United States,
541 U.S. 600, 608 (2004). As Congress found, many uninsured individuals will inevitably
receive health care services for which they cannot pay, imposing billions of dollars in costs on
6

Indeed, even before Raich, the Fourth Circuit had made clear that Congress may regulate even
noneconomic activity that burdens an interstate market. The court upheld the Freedom of Access
to Clinic Entrances Act (“FACE Act”), which makes it unlawful to obstruct access to a
reproductive health care facility. See Hoffman v. Hunt, 126 F.3d 575, 583-88 (4th Cir. 1997),
cert. denied, 523 U.S. 1136 (1998). The relevant question is not (as plaintiffs would have it,
Opp’n 23) whether the immediate subject of the regulation is economic, but whether it is “related
to interstate commerce in a manner that is clear, relatively direct, and distinct from the type of
relationship that can be hypothesized to exist between every significant activity and interstate
commerce.” Brzonkala v. Va. Polytechnic Inst., 169 F.3d 820, 837 (4th Cir. 1999) (en banc),
aff’d sub nom. United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598 (2000).
10
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the national economy. Indeed, it is difficult to imagine legislation more clearly economic than
regulation of how health care services are financed. And the decision about how to finance one’s
health care services—whether to purchase insurance or to attempt to pay later, out of pocket—is
plainly “economic.” These decisions—viewed in the aggregate—clearly and directly affect
health care providers, taxpayers, and the insured population, who ultimately, and inevitably, pay
for the care provided to those who go without insurance. Congress may address those effects
under the Commerce Clause.
Plaintiffs also insist that the minimum coverage provision reflects a “socialist mentality”
that “would allow Congress to nationalize anything on the assumption that all must pay in order
to make the object of regulation affordable to all.” Opp’n 24. According to plaintiffs, the
minimum coverage provision “is analogous to Congress compelling every person in America to
purchase a Chevrolet.” Id. at 25. But the better analogy is to Congress requiring persons who
already do buy Chevrolets (and invariably will continue to buy them) to finance the purchase
through a means that will minimize the economic burdens on others. The market for Chevrolets
is unlike the market for health care services; many people do not participate in the market for
Chevrolets or, for that matter, any other type of car. But no one can opt out of the health care
services market. And, unlike other markets, individuals cannot reliably predict whether and
when they or their families will need health care. The healthy 20-year-old biker who is seriously
injured instantly becomes a consumer of costly medical care, as does the healthy 40-year old
who develops a brain tumor. The question is how participants in the health care market finance
medical expenses—through insurance, or through an attempt to pay out of pocket, often
unsuccessfully, with a backstop of uncompensated care funded by third parties. In contrast to the

11
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health care market, one who appears at a dealership without any money will not receive a free
Chevrolet and shift his cost to other participants in the market for automobiles. The distinctive
characteristics of the health care market—a combination of universal need, unavoidable
uncertainty, and the associated cost-shifting—make it unique. Regulating the financing of health
care goods and services in a way that reduces these untoward economic effects does not open the
floodgates to the “socialist mentality” that plaintiffs fear.
C.

Plaintiffs cannot deny these substantial effects by characterizing the decision
to forego insurance as “inactivity”

Plaintiffs attempt to portray those individuals who make the economic decision to forego
health insurance as “not engaged in any activity” and “simply existing.” Opp’n 23.

But

individuals who make the economic choice to finance their medical needs without insurance
have not opted out of the health care market. To the contrary, far from being inactive bystanders,
the majority of the population—even of the uninsured population—has participated in the health
care market by receiving medical services. 7 See, e.g., Uninsured and Untreated: A Look at
Uninsured Adults Who Received No Medical Care for Two Years 1 (Kaiser Fam. Found. 2010)
(available at http://www.kff.org/uninsured/upload/8083.pdf) (noting that 62% of the uninsured
below 133% of the Federal Poverty Level have used some medical care in the last two years). 8
7

Plaintiffs assert that this argument “contradict[s] the allegations of the Complaint—that
Plaintiffs pay for their health care costs regardless of whether they have insurance.” Opp’n 24.
But even if plaintiffs were among the fortunate and small number of people who will always be
able to pay for their own health care expenses (which, of course, they cannot know now), they
would still be subject to congressional regulation under the Commerce Clause. “Where the class
of activities is regulated and that class is within the reach of federal power, the courts have no
power to excise, as trivial, individual instances of the class.” Raich, 545 U.S. at 23 (quoting
Perez v. United States, 402 U.S. 146, 154 (1971) (internal quotation omitted)).
8
See also Summary Health Statistics for U.S. Children: National Health Interview Survey 2008,
at tbl. 13 at 37 (Centers for Disease Control and Prevention 2009) (available at
http://www.cdc.gov/nchs/data/series/sr_10/sr10_244.pdf) (noting that nearly half of uninsured
12
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Nor do those individuals reside passively outside the market for health insurance. Instead,
individuals make economic decisions as to whether to finance their medical needs through
insurance, or to try to do so out-of-pocket with the backstop of free emergency room care.
Indeed, a majority of those without insurance coverage at any point in fact move in and out of
coverage, and have had coverage at some point within the same year. Cong. Budget Office, How
Many Lack Health Insurance and For How Long? 4, 9 (May 2003); see also Cong. Budget
Office, Key Issues in Analyzing Major Health Insurance Proposals 11 (Dec. 2008).
Plaintiffs’ description of these economic decisions as “inactivity” or “simply existing” is
both wrong and wholly beside the point. Opp’n 23, 49. Congress may use its commerce power
to regulate conduct, even conduct that can creatively be described as “inactivity,” so long as it
determines that the conduct substantially affects interstate commerce. Courts have rejected, for
example, challenges to the Child Support Recovery Act, 18 U.S.C. § 228(a), which affirmatively
requires child support payments in interstate commerce. 9 And it is well-settled that Congress
may require private parties to enter into insurance contracts where failing to do so would impose
costs on other market participants. 10 Moreover, under the Superfund Act, or CERCLA, 42
U.S.C. §§ 9601, et seq., Congress requires “covered persons,” including property owners
children had seen a doctor in the last six months and 85% had seen a doctor in the last two
years).
9
See, e.g., United States v. Sage, 92 F.3d 101, 105-06 (2d Cir. 1996) (rejecting claim that the
Act exceeds the commerce power “because it concerns not the sending of money interstate but
the failure to send money”).
10
42 U.S.C. § 4012a(a), (b), (e) (owners of property in flood hazard areas); 49 U.S.C. §
13906(a)(1) (interstate motor carriers); 6 U.S.C. § 443(a)(1) (sellers of anti-terrorism
technology); 16 U.S.C. § 1441(c)(4) (entities operating in national marine sanctuary); 30 U.S.C.
§ 1257(f) (surface coal mining and reclamation operators); 42 U.S.C. § 2210(a) (Price-Anderson
Act) (operators of nuclear power plants); 42 U.S.C. § 2243(d)(1) (uranium enrichment facility
operators); 42 U.S.C. § 2458c(b)(2)(A) (aerospace vehicle developers); 45 U.S.C. § 358(a)
(railroad unemployment insurance).
13
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(whether or not they are engaged in commercial activity), to pay for environmental damages
caused from the release of hazardous substances. The statute imposes a strict liability regime; a
current property owner may be subject to a remediation order, without any showing that he
caused the contamination. § 9607(a). The owner’s characterization of his behavior as “active”
or “passive” is irrelevant; otherwise, “an owner could insulate himself from liability by virtue of
his passivity.” Nurad, Inc. v. William E. Hooper & Sons Co., 966 F.2d 837, 845 (4th Cir. 1992).
Congress’s authority to enact the Superfund Act is well-established. See United States v. Olin
Corp., 107 F.3d 1506, 1510-11 (11th Cir. 1997). It is also clear that Congress may use the power
of eminent domain to compel the private transfer of land in aid of the regulation of interstate
commerce. Luxton v. N. River Bridge Co., 153 U.S. 525, 529-30 (1894) (collecting cases)
(upholding the use of eminent domain as a means to execute Congress’s Commerce Clause
authority).
These examples illustrate that the scope of the commerce power does not turn on whether
a creative plaintiff can describe his own behavior as “active” or “passive.” And for good reason;
such a standard would be arbitrary and unworkable, as courts would have to determine when
“passivity” ends and “activity” begins. Even under plaintiffs’ theory, Congress could regulate
how an individual pays for health care services at the time the individual appears at the doctor’s
office to seek care. But it would be unclear whether Congress could regulate the individual who
schedules an appointment a week or a month in advance, or the individual who went to the
doctor a week before the law became effective, or a year before. Would congressional authority
lapse if an individual neither bought insurance nor used medical services in the last year? The

14
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last quarter? The last month? These are not the sorts of questions upon which congressional
authority should turn, but they would flow inevitably from acceptance of plaintiffs’ theory.
D.

The minimum coverage provision is a valid exercise of Congress’s
independent power under the General Welfare Clause

The minimum coverage provision also falls within Congress’s power under the General
Welfare Clause, U.S. Const. art. I, § 8, cl. 1. Plaintiffs argue that Congress may not “use its
taxing power to penalize those who do not conform to government regulations,” Opp’n 30, and
that “Congress’ intent is not to generate revenue, but to take over the health care industry and
regulate individual decision-making by ‘taxing’ those who depart from acceptable practices,” id.
But the Supreme Court long ago put to rest “distinctions between regulatory and revenue-raising
taxes,” Bob Jones Univ., 416 U.S. at 741 n.12, and despite plaintiffs’ protestations, there is no
basis to revive those distinctions here. Even if the earlier cases cited by plaintiffs had any
lingering validity, Opp’n 29-30, they suggest at most that a court may invalidate only penalties
that, unlike the minimum coverage provision, are punitive or coercive. See, e.g., Carter v.
Carter Coal Co., 298 U.S. 238 (1936). Indeed, other cases leave no doubt that Congress may
exercise its General Welfare Clause power even for a regulatory purpose, even if that regulatory
purpose is beyond its Commerce Clause powers. See United States v. Sanchez, 340 U.S. 42, 44
(1950). So long as a statute is “productive of some revenue,” the courts will not second-guess
Congress’s exercise of its General Welfare Clause powers, and “will not undertake, by collateral
inquiry as to the measure of the regulatory effect of a tax, to ascribe to Congress an attempt,
under the guise of taxation, to exercise another power denied by the Federal Constitution.”
Sonzinsky v. United States, 300 U.S. 506, 514 (1937); see also United States v. Jones, 976 F.2d
176, 183-84 (4th Cir. 1992); United States v. Aiken, 974 F.2d 446, 448-49 (4th Cir. 1992).
15
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Plaintiffs’ contention that “there is no guarantee that any money will ever be collected”
because non-exempted “[i]ndividuals . . . will pay the penalties only if they fail to obtain and
maintain ‘minimum essential coverage,’” Opp’n 30, is likewise misplaced. The Supreme Court
has upheld such provisions even where, if fully successful in achieving the regulatory purpose,
they would completely eliminate the activity that is taxed. See Sanchez, 340 U.S. at 44 (“It is
beyond serious question that a tax does not cease to be valid merely because it regulates,
discourages, or even definitely deters the activities taxed.”) (emphasis added); see also United
States v. Kahriger, 345 U.S. 22, 27-28 (1953).
E.

The employer responsibility provision is a valid exercise of Congress’s
Commerce Clause authority and, independently, its General Welfare Clause
power

Plaintiffs do not dispute that regulation of the terms and conditions of employment in the
national labor market falls within the commerce power, or that health care coverage, like wages,
is a term of employment Congress may regulate under its commerce power. Nor do plaintiffs
dispute that Congress’s bases for passing the provision—among others, to address the “job-lock”
concern—are rational. Plaintiffs nonetheless contend that the employer responsibility provision
is invalid because requiring “employers [to] provide certain benefits to their employees” is
somehow different from requiring them to “conform to wage and hour standards.” Opp’n 25-26.
But plaintiffs do not, and cannot, explain why this supposed distinction should make a difference
for purposes of the Commerce Clause. Nothing in the Supreme Court’s precedent supports the
idea that Congress’s power over the terms and conditions of employment excludes the power to
require employers to provide their employees certain benefits. Quite the opposite. “Today, there
should be universal agreement on the proposition that Congress has ample power to regulate the
16
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terms and conditions of employment,” and employee benefits are indisputably “conditions of
employment.” See EEOC v. Wyoming, 460 U.S. 226, 248 (1983) (Stevens, J., concurring),
superseded by statute and implicitly overruled on other grounds by Kimel v. Fla. Bd. of Regents,
528 U.S. 62, 79 (2000).
F.

The ACA does not violate the Tenth Amendment

Defendants have shown that the ACA is a proper exercise of Congress’s commerce
power and, independently, its authority under the General Welfare Clause. There accordingly
can be no violation of the Tenth Amendment: “If a power is delegated to Congress in the
Constitution, the Tenth Amendment expressly disclaims any reservation of that power to the
States; if a power is an attribute of state sovereignty reserved by the Tenth Amendment, it is
necessarily a power the Constitution has not conferred on Congress.” New York v. United States,
505 U.S. 144, 156 (1992).
Plaintiffs contend that “even if the Act were to be found to fall within Congress’s
enumerated powers, then it would still violate the Tenth Amendment because it impermissibly
intrudes on state sovereignty,” Opp’n 31, allegedly because the ACA “commandeer[s]” the
states. Id. at 32 (internal citation omitted). But even if this claim had merit—which it does
not—an individual plaintiff lacks standing to raise an anti-commandeering challenge; such
claims may be advanced only by a State itself. See Tenn. Elec. Power Co. v. TVA, 306 U.S. 118
(1939) (private parties had “no standing to raise any question under the [Tenth A]mendment”
“absent the states or their officers” as parties to the litigation). 11 In any event, contrary to
11

See also United States v. Hacker, 565 F.3d 522, 524, 525-527 (8th Cir. 2009); Brooklyn Legal
Servs. Corp. v. Legal Servs. Corp., 462 F.3d 219, 234-235 (2d Cir. 2006); Medeiros v. Vincent,
431 F.3d 25, 28-29, 33-36 (1st Cir. 2005); United States v. Parker, 362 F.3d 1279, 1284-1285
(10th Cir. 2004).
17
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plaintiffs’ assertion, the ACA does not “mandate[] that states establish ‘Health Benefit
Exchanges.’” Opp’n 33. Rather, the ACA gives States the option to do so, and requires the
federal government to establish the Exchange if a State does not. Pub. L. No. 111-148, §§
1321(b), (c).
G.

The ACA does not offend the Guarantee Clause

Plaintiffs insist that the Act violates the Guarantee Clause because it “give[s] government
the absolute sovereignty over the people,” Opp’n 34, grants the government “censorial power
over the people,” id., and “threatens the foundational principles of the Constitution,” id. at 35.
According to plaintiffs, this violates the principle that “[t]he people, not the government,
possess the absolute sovereignty.” Id. at 34 (boldface in original). This is long on rhetorical
flourish but short on legal substance. Nothing in the Act grants the government a “censorial
power” or an “absolute sovereignty over the people.” The uninsured’s ability to impose their
costs on other participants in the health care market—which the ACA does threaten—is not a
“foundational principle[]” of republican governance. The Guarantee Clause applies only “in
highly limited circumstances,” Largess v. Supreme Judicial Court for State of Mass., 373 F.3d
219, 227 (1st Cir. 2004), which are not present here. The Republic is not in peril.
III.

PLAINTIFFS’ FIRST AMENDMENT CLAIMS ARE MERITLESS
A.

The ACA does not violate the Free Exercise Clause or the Religious Freedom
Restoration Act

Plaintiffs do not dispute that the minimum coverage provision in no way requires them to
abandon their opposition to abortion.

Plaintiffs contend nevertheless that defendants have

“misrepresent[ed]” the “true nature” of plaintiffs’ free exercise claims because, in addition to
opposing abortion, plaintiffs believe in “making healthy lifestyle choices, paying only for health
18
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care procedures that are necessary and in keeping with their religious beliefs and paying for their
health care services as they need them.”

Opp’n 35, 36.

But this clarification confirms

defendants’ showing that there is no burden on plaintiffs’ religious exercise. The ACA does not
prevent plaintiffs from “making healthy lifestyle choices.” Nor does it require plaintiffs to pay
for unnecessary medical procedures or any health care service that conflicts with their religious
beliefs.

Rather, the Act may require non-exempted individual plaintiffs to have minimum

essential coverage or pay a penalty, and this does not conflict with plaintiffs’ religious beliefs.
Even if the ACA burdened plaintiffs’ religious exercise, it is well-settled that “the right of
free exercise does not relieve an individual of the obligation to comply with a valid and neutral
law of general applicability on the ground that the law proscribes (or prescribes) conduct that his
religion prescribes (or proscribes).” Emp’t Div. v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872, 879 (1990) (internal
citation and quotation omitted). Plaintiffs argue that the minimum coverage provision is not a
neutral law of general applicability because it contains certain exemptions. See Opp’n 36-38.
But Congress may provide some limited exemptions from an otherwise uniformly applicable
system without destroying the law’s “general applicability.” In United States v. Lee, an Amish
plaintiff challenged the exemption from self-employment tax provided by 26 U.S.C. § 1402(g).
455 U.S. 252 (1982).

In rejecting the challenge, the Court reasoned that “Congress has

accommodated, to the extent compatible with a comprehensive national program, the practices of
those who believe it a violation of their faith to participate in the social security system,” but that
“every person cannot be shielded from all the burdens incident to exercising every aspect of the
right to practice religious beliefs.” Id. at 260-61. According to the Court, “[t]he tax . . . must be
uniformly applicable to all, except as Congress provides explicitly otherwise.” Id. at 261. And
19
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in Smith, the Court referred to the social security tax itself, which contains the § 1402(g)
exemption, as “a neutral, generally applicable regulatory law that compelled activity forbidden
by an individual's religion.” Smith, 494 U.S. at 880. 12 The minimum coverage provision, which
specifically incorporates the § 1402(g) exemption, is no different.
Even if strict scrutiny somehow applies to plaintiffs’ free exercise and RFRA claims, the
minimum coverage provision is justified by a compelling government interest, and is the least
restrictive means to achieve that interest. Since the Supreme Court’s decision in Lee, courts have
rejected Free Exercise challenges to the tax code by individuals who do not qualify for the
exemption in section 1402(g), as it is “well settled that the collection of tax revenues for
expenditures that offend the religious beliefs of individual taxpayers does not violate the Free
Exercise Clause of the First Amendment.” Jenkins v. Comm’r, 483 F.3d 90, 92 (2d Cir. 2007)
(citing Lee); see also United States v. Indianapolis Baptist Temple, 224 F.3d 627 (7th Cir. 2000);
Adams v. Comm’r, 170 F.3d 173 (3d Cir. 1999); Browne v. United States, 176 F.3d 25 (2d Cir.
1999); Droz v. Comm’r, 48 F.3d 1120 (9th Cir. 1995). The rationale supporting this well-settled
principle is that “mandatory participation” in the payment of taxes is “indispensable to the fiscal
12

Contrary to plaintiffs’ claim, Opp’n 48, Gonzales v. O Centro Espirita Beneficente Uniao do
Vegetal, 546 U.S. 418 (2006) does not change this conclusion. There, a religious sect sought an
exemption under the Controlled Substances Act for the use of hoasca, a hallucinogenic tea. The
Court granted the exemption, reasoning that “the well-established peyote exception . . . fatally
undermines the Government’s broader contention that the Controlled Substances Act establishes
a closed regulatory system that admits of no exceptions under RFRA.” Id. at 434. The Court
reasoned that “[e]verything the Government says about . . . hoasca . . . applies in equal measure
to . . . peyote.” Id. at 433. But unlike the peyote exemption in Gonzales, the minimum coverage
provision’s exemptions do not undermine the government’s stated purpose. The religious
exemptions here apply only to those who belong to groups that already make provision for the
health needs of the dependent members; those people already receive health care and do not
impose the costs of uncompensated care on the rest of society. Indeed, the Gonzales Court
specifically distinguished Lee, noting that the tax cases involved statutory programs in which
granting exemptions would undermine the administration of the program. Id. at 437.
20

Case 6:10-cv-00015-nkm-mfu Document 36

Filed 09/22/10 Page 31 of 37

vitality” and operation of the tax system in general and the social security system in particular,
thus satisfying the compelling interest and least restrictive means tests under the Free Exercise
Clause. Lee, 455 U.S. at 258; see also Adams, 170 F.3d at 179.
In light of this settled case law, the same principle applies to the national, mandatory
application of a system of health insurance with religious accommodation provided by section
1402(g). Without question, the minimum coverage provision’s objectives—including promoting
the public health—constitute a compelling government interest. See, e.g., Hodel v. Va. Surface
Mining & Reclamation Ass’n, 452 U.S. 264, 300 (1981). And, as Congress found, the health
insurance system is “national,” and the minimum coverage requirement, which achieves “nearuniversal coverage,” is “essential” to the implementation of the ACA’s broader insurance
reforms. Pub. L. No. 111-148, § 1501(a)(2). Thus, as with Social Security, “the Government’s
interest in assuring mandatory and continuous participation in and contribution to the [ACA]
system” satisfies the Free Exercise Clause and RFRA. Lee, 455 U.S. at 258-59; see also Droz,
48 F.3d at 1123 (finding that individual who does not belong to a religious organization that
provides for its dependent members, and thus was outside the exemption of section 1402(g),
“would threaten Congress’s goal of ensuring that persons who opt out are provided for (and will
not burden the public welfare system)”). In fact, the rationale of the tax cases has been extended
to the context of a mandatory state requirement that individuals purchase health insurance. See
Goehring v. Brophy, 94 F.3d 1294, 1298 (9th Cir. 1996), overruled on other grounds by City of
Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507 (1997) (holding RFRA unconstitutional as applied to states).
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The ACA does not violate plaintiffs’ free speech or free association rights

Defendants have shown that plaintiffs’ free speech claim is meritless, as the ACA
contains multiple safeguards designed to prevent federal funds from being used to pay for
abortions except with respect to the long-established exceptions that apply to other federal health
programs in cases of rape or incest, or when the life of the woman is endangered. Opening Br.
46-48. Plaintiffs do not respond to this point. As for expressive association, the ACA does not
prevent plaintiffs from expressing their views about anything, or require them to express a view
with which they disagree. There is accordingly no violation of the right to expressive association
here. In response, plaintiffs recycle the claim that this case is somehow different because of
“Congress’ unprecedented act of mandating that individuals and employers involuntarily
participate in economic activity.” Opp’n 39. But even if plaintiffs were correct (which they are
not) to describe the economic decision to forgo insurance as “inactivity,” that would not create a
First Amendment question here. A right to avoid association exists only if compelled association
“may impair the ability” of a group or an individual to express a message, Roberts v. U.S.
Jaycees, 468 U.S. 609, 623 (1984); whether plaintiffs are engaged in “activity” or “inactivity” is
irrelevant to that question. They remain free to express their views.
C.

The ACA’s religious exemptions are consistent with the Establishment
Clause

Plaintiffs concede that they are not challenging the constitutionality of 26 U.S.C. §
1402(g)(1). Opp’n 42. This concession resolves the matter, as the challenged exemption from
the minimum coverage provision specifically incorporates the 1402(g)(1) exemption. Plaintiffs
nonetheless insist that defendants “miss the point” because they “ignore the language calling for
government investigation and monitoring of the tenets of certain religious sects and sincerity of
22
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adherents’ beliefs.” Opp’n 41-42. This point is deservedly missed, as the ACA exemption
contains nearly the same “monitoring” requirements as the § 1402(g)(1) exemption. Just as the
ACA exempts only members of “recognized religious sect[s],” Pub. L. No. 111-148, § 1501(b)
(adding 26 U.S.C. § 5000A(d)(2)(A)), § 1402(g)(1) exempts only “member[s] of a recognized
religious sect.” 26 U.S.C. § 1402(g)(1). The ACA requires that the exempted individual be “an
adherent of established tenets or teachings of such sect or division,” Pub. L. No. 111-148, §
1501(b) (adding 26 U.S.C. § 5000A(d)(2)(A)(ii)); § 1402(g)(1) likewise requires that the
exempted individual be “an adherent of established tenets or teachings of such sect or division.”
26 U.S.C. § 1402(g)(1). As defendants have shown, every court to consider the issue has upheld
§ 1402(g)(1) under the Establishment Clause, Opening Br. 49 n.21, and plaintiffs provide no
basis to distinguish § 1402(g)(1) from the nearly identical section of the ACA. 13
IV.

PLAINTIFFS’ EQUAL PROTECTION CLAUSE CLAIM SHOULD BE
DISMISSED
Plaintiffs contend that the ACA’s religious exemptions are irrational because they do not

fully achieve their stated purpose; in other words, the exemptions are irrational because plaintiffs
do not qualify for them. See Opp’n 46 (“If the exemption for religious sects is designed to
exempt individuals who will very likely not incur uncompensated care and lead to cost-shifting,
then it is not rationally advancing that goal by excluding Plaintiffs, particularly Plaintiffs
Waddell and Merrill who take responsibility for their own health care.”). Besides relying on the
questionable assumption that Waddell and Merrill will forever be able to pay for their own health
13

Nor does the exemption for members of health care sharing ministries, Pub. L. No. 111-148, §
1501(b) (adding 26 U.S.C. § 5000A(d)(2)(B)), foster excessive entanglement with religion. The
inquiry required by that exemption—whether members “share a common set of ethical or
religious beliefs and share medical expenses among members in accordance with those beliefs,”
id. § 5000A(d)(2)(B)(ii)(II)—is no more intrusive than the inquiry mandated by § 1402(g)(1)
(described above).
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care needs, this argument misunderstands the rational basis test. That a statute is underinclusive
does not show that it is irrational. 14 “[T]he reform may take one step at a time, addressing itself
to the phase of the problem which seems most acute to the legislative mind.” Williamson v. Lee
Optical of Okla., 348 U.S. 483, 489 (1955). “The legislature may select one phase of one field
and apply a remedy there, neglecting the others.” Id. Here, Congress rationally determined that
members of groups that have historically made provision for their dependent members, or are
members of health care sharing ministries, are unlikely to incur uncompensated care, and
Congress was entitled to limit the exemptions to these groups. 15
V.

THE ACA IS NOT A DIRECT TAX OR A CAPITATION TAX
Contrary to plaintiffs’ view, Opp’n 49-50, the penalty on non-exempted individuals for

failing to obtain minimum coverage is not a flat tax assessed without regard to an individual’s
circumstances, nor is it a direct tax subject to apportionment. Plaintiffs argue that the penalty is
imposed “without regard to property, profession, or any other circumstance except for being
legally present in the United States.” Id. at 50. This is incorrect; the provision does not impose a
penalty on everyone, it imposes a penalty on the choice of one particular, often unsuccessful
14

Plaintiffs incorrectly suggest that under the rational basis test, defendants must cite evidence in
support of Congress’s reasons for enacting the religious exemptions. Opp’n 44-45. The secular
legislative purpose of the religious exemptions—to alleviate burdens on religious exercise for
those who are unlikely to incur uncompensated care—is clear from the statutory text. In any
event, it is well understood that a legislative choice reviewed for a rational basis “is not subject
to courtroom fact-finding.” FCC v. Beach Comm’s, 508 U.S. 307, 315 (1993). Defendants
accordingly have “no obligation to produce evidence to sustain the rationality of a statutory
classification.” Heller v. Doe by Doe, 509 U.S. 312, 320 (1993). The analysis instead asks
whether the legislature “rationally could have believed” that the conditions of the statute would
promote its objective. W. & S. Life Ins. Co. v. State Bd. of Equalization of Cal., 451 U.S. 648,
671-72 (1981).
15
Plaintiffs also insist that Congress irrationally limited the exemption to health care sharing
ministries that are at least ten years old. Opp’n 46. To the contrary, the ten-year limitation
ensures that only health care ministries with established records of providing for their members
qualify for the exemption. See Opening Br. 54.
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The penalty imposed under the employer

responsibility provision likewise is imposed only on certain large employers that refuse to offer
adequate coverage to their full-time employees and have a full-time employee who receives a
premium tax credit in a health insurance Exchange. 16
Plaintiffs also suggest that indirect taxes must always be imposed on actions, never on
“inactivity.” Id. at 49 (emphasis in original). In addition to having the problems of plaintiffs’
Commerce Clause inaction argument, this argument cannot distinguish Hylton v. United States,
where the tax was on owning carriages, not on using them. 3 U.S. (3 Dall.) 171 (1796). Nor can
it account for the penalty for the failure to file a return or to pay taxes when due, 26 U.S.C. §
6651, or the estate tax, id. § 2001. See Knowlton v. Moore, 178 U.S. 41, 81 (1900). Regardless,
plaintiffs’ distinction between “action” and “inaction” is irrelevant. Only taxes on real property
or (possibly) all of an individual’s personal property qualify as “direct.” See Union Elec. Co. v.
United States, 363 F.3d 1292, 1300 (Fed. Cir. 2004). And capitation taxes are only those taxes
imposed “without regard to property, profession, or any other circumstance.” Hylton, 3 U.S. (3
Dall.) at 175 (opinion of Chase, J.). The minimum coverage provision is neither type of tax. 17
CONCLUSION
Defendants’ motion to dismiss should be granted.

16

Plaintiffs do not dispute that the limits that Article I, Section 9 imposes on Congress’s power
to tax and spend for the general welfare have no relevance if the minimum coverage provision is
sustained under the Commerce Clause. See also Rodgers v. United States, 138 F.2d 992, 995
(6th Cir. 1943).
17
As the penalty varies with the amount of an individual’s household income, plaintiffs are
wrong to assert that the penalty does not implicate the Sixteenth Amendment.
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